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Guidelines on Evidence Concerning
Testamentary Capacity
On December 28, 1936, Miss Hattie Hewlett executed a holo-
graphic will while being cared for at an Austin rest home. The will
created a trust for five relatives and their children, with remainder to
the University of Texas for scholarships. When Miss Hewlett died in
1960, certain of her relatives contested the will, claiming that testa-
trix was not of sound mind when she executed the instrument. The
trial court permitted the witnesses for the contesting relatives to testi-
fy that Miss Hewlett was not mentally capable of understanding the
nature of her acts and was of unsound mind. However, the court
would not allow a psychiatrist, who had never met or examined Miss
Hewlett, to testify on matters advanced by the proponents such as
whether Miss Hewlett, when she wrote the will, "had sufficient ability
to understand . . . the effects of her acts in making the will" and
whether she "was mentally capable and had sufficient mind to under-
stand the effect of her acts in making a will."' The will was held
invalid. The court of civil appeals affirmed, and the proponents
brought error. Held, reversed and remanded: The trial court's exclu-
sion of the testimony was harmful error. In will contests testimony
relating to the testator's general mental capacity, as opposed to testi-
mony involving legal definitions or conclusions, should be admitted.
Carr v. Radkey, 393 S.W. 2d 806 (Tex. 1965).
In proving that the testator possessed testamentary capacity when
he executed the will, a proponent must bring forth evidence showing
that the testator at such time understood the following factors: the
business in which he was engaged, the nature and extent of his prop-
erty, the natural objects of his bounty and their claims upon him, the
effect of the instrument he executed, the person or persons to whom
he meant to bequeath his property, and the method of distribution.'
See excerpts at Carr v. Radkey, 393 S.W.2d 806, 809-10 (Tex. 1965). The complete
will is reproduced at 384 S.W.2d 738-39. Curiously, the trial court admitted questions to
the psychiatrist using the phrase sound mind. Since TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. S 57 (1956)
states that a testator must be of sound mind when executing a will it would seem that,
with the trial court's reluctance to admit testimony, this would have been excluded also.
Nevertheless, the trial court permitted the psychiatrist to testify: "I think she [testatrix]
was of unsound mind in my definition of it."
2 Oliver v. Williams, 381 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Walker,
288 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Christner v. Mayer, 123 S.W.2d 715, 720 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1938) error dism. judm. corr. See generally, ATKINSON, WILLS S 51, at 232-41
(1953) and GARDNER, WILLS § 31, at 87-91 (1916); 61 TEX. JUR. 2d, at 118-19. See also
5 57, Texas Probate Code which uses the phrase "sound mind." "Sound mind" and "testa-
mentary capacity" have often been held synonymous-see note 14 infra and accompanying
text. However, the Texas Supreme Court in Radkey held the former to be a description of
mental condition instead of a legal definition.
Admissibility of evidence is very troublesome since, although the term
testamentary capacity is a legal term encompassing several factual
components, for a layman the term itself is not easily distinguishable
from these factual elements which compose capacity.
In Carr v. Radkey the Texas Supreme Court laid two clear guide-
lines on evidence concerning testamentary capacity and resolved cer-
tain issues in a third area. First, the court recognized the Texas rule
that the existence of a sensible holographic will is not conclusive proof
that the testator had testamentary capacity when the will was exe-
cuted. The court has consistently rejected authority from other juris-
dictions which would establish such a conclusion as a matter of law.3
Second, it reaffirmed the Texas rule, also contra to some foreign au-
thority, that an adjudication that an individual is of unsound mind
which takes place subsequent to execution of his will, is not admissible
in evidence on the question of testamentary capacity at the time of
execution of the will."
The court noted that admissibility of opinion testimony in testa-
mentary capacity cases has been in a state of flux and uncertainty. In
approaching this murky area, the court addressed itself to the three
following levels of analysis: (1) the policy underlying former deci-
sions; (2) the theories used to carry out this policy; and (3) the tests
used to apply one of those theories to practice.
The policy governing admission of opinion testimony in testamen-
tary capacity cases is to avoid testimony which might confuse jurors
and prejudice their decisions or which is superfluous.' Before Radkey,
Texas courts interpreting this policy had taken both strict and liberal
attitudes on admission policy, depending, apparently, on the particular
court's faith in jurors' abilities to make intelligent and unbiased deci-
sions. The strict attitude indicated a lack of confidence in the jurors
and resulted in striking down testimony even slightly tinged with
irrelevancy or confusion! The liberal attitude stressed admission of
all relevant testimony.'
To enforce either a strict or liberal policy, Texas courts before
3 See Carr v. Radkey, 393 S.W.2d 806, 814-15 and authorities cited therein.
4 Id. at 815 and authorities cited therein.
' I MCCORMIC & RAY, TEXAS EVIDENCE § 2, at 5 (2d ed. 1956). "[T~he very purpose
of the exclusionary rules is to keep from the jury evidence which may prejudice them in
their decisions." See Adamson v. Burgle, 186 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref.
w.m., citing 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1918, at 10 (3d ed. 1940) which argues that the basis
for exclusion should be whether the evidence is superfluous, i.e., whether the court or jury
does or does not need the evidence.
"See Sharpy, Civil Juries, Their Decline and Eventual Fall, 11 LOYOLA L. REv. 243
(1962-63) criticizing the jury system.
"See Norvell, Invasion of the Province of the Jury, 31 TEXAS L. REV. 731 (1953)
which suggests that the jury system and jurors are quite capable of making correct decisions.
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Radkey relied on three theoretical bases. The first two theories,'
though closely related, on occasion were stated as two separate theories
by the courts. Both approaches emphasized that it is the jury's exclu-
sive function to decide the question of whether a testator had testa-
mentary capacity at the time of making his will. Under the first
theory, testimony was excluded when it specifically invaded the pro-
vince of the jury;' under the second, when it answered the ultimate
issue.1" Under either theory, if a witness were allowed to express his
opinion on testamentary capacity, he would usurp the jury's func-
tion.
The third theory appears to have been grounded on a law-fact dis-
tinction, i.e., that the judge decides questions of law and the jury
decides questions of fact.1 This theory excluded testimony which
forced the witness to concern himself with matters of law because
the witness would have to define the law in his own mind and then
draw a conclusion upon his possibly erroneous definition. The reason-
ing was that a witness' guess at a legal definition or conclusion was
superfluous and only served to confuse the jury.
In deciding whether to exclude opinion testimony under the law-
fact theory, a test drawing a line between law and fact was necessary.
Texas courts approached this problem in two ways. Some, relying
literally upon the language of the question to the witness, appeared
in effect to approve a word-of-art test. Such courts excluded testi-
mony automatically when the phrase "legal capacity" was used." Some
courts went a step further, equating the phrases "mental capacity,"
"competency" and "unsound mind" with legal capacity, thus exclud-
ing testimony using any of these terms.'4 The second test, under which
8 2 MCCORMICK & RAY, oP. cit. supra note 4, § 1395, at 988, where the authors note that
witnesses may not express opinions on any ultimate fact in issue because such testimony would
invade the province of the jury. See also Bell v. Bell, 248 S.W.2d 978 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952)
error ref. n.r.e., which states: "To permit such testimony (on testamentary capacity) in-
vades the province of the jury and authorizes the witness to determine the very issue for the
court and jury."
'Brown v. Mitchell, 88 Tex. 350, 31 S.W. 621, 625 (1895); Pickering v. Harris, 23
S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930).
"°Crawford v. El Paso Sash & Door Co., 288 S.W. 169 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926). Note
that authorities list the invasion of the province of the jury theory and the ultimate issue
theory as "*erroneous" theories of exclusion under the opinion rule, 2 McCORMscK & RAY,
op. cit. supra note 4, § 1395, at 219; and 7 WIGMORE, op. cit. susra note 5.
"Haynes v. Taylor, 35 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931); City of Nacogdoches v.
Wise, 300 S.W. 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
2 Lindley v. Lindley, 384 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. 1964); Brown v. Mitchell, 88 Tex. 350,
31 S.W. 621 (1895); Adamson v. Burgle, 186 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error
ref. w.m.
"2See Stout, Some Problems in the Trial of a Will Contest, 7 BAYLOR L. REV. 121
(1955), suggesting that the courts may have, in effect, applied a word-of-art test to solve
the problem of distinguishing law and fact.
4 Nowlin v. Trottman, 348 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) error ref. n.r.e.; Nass




substance rather than form was controlling, looked at the entirety
of the questions. This substantive test made exclusion turn on a
distinction between testimony related to legal definitions or conclu-
sions and testimony related to general mental condition." The former
was inadmissible because it involved questions of law; while the lat-
ter was admissible as concerning fact.
To differentiate between the substantive and word-of-art tests, an
example is helpful. If a witness is asked: "Do you think the testator
had sufficient capacity to execute a will?" testimony is inadmissible
under the substantive test because the witness is forced to define a
legal concept. In the same example, under a textbook application of
the word-of-art test, the testimony is admissible because none of the
prohibited phrases is used. It should be noted that questions asking
whether a testator knew the objects of his bounty,"6 knew his rela-
tives," understood the disposition, " knew the nature and extent of
his property," etc.,"° have been generally admissible under either test.
Only when the testimony more directly approached the issue of tes-
tamentary capacity has ambiguity prevailed.
The principal case addressed itself to all three levels of analysis and
attempted to give the legal profession guidelines in testamentary
capacity cases. The court began its discussion by reviewing the law in
this area. The first major case was Scalf v. Collin County," which set
out a liberal policy of admission in testamentary capacity cases. The
court in Scalf declared that a witness may state his opinion as to the
sanity of a person, regardless of whether the opinion involves the
ultimate issue. Brown v. Mitchell" established the law-fact distinction
and overruled prior cases inconsistent with its holding, though not
mentioning Scalf by name. The dictum-laden Brown decision created
a dispute as to the proper interpretation of the case. Pickering v.
"sLindley v. Lindley, 384 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. 1964); Brown v. Mitchell, 88 Tex. 350,
31 S.W. 621 (1895); Adamson v. Burgle, 186 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref.
w.M.
Is Garrison v. Blanton, 48 Tex. 299 (1877); Bartel's Estate, 164 S.W. 859 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1914) error ref.
"Green v. Dickson, 208 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.
's Barton v. Bailey, 202 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) error ref. n.r.e.
'"Nowlin v. Trottman, 348 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) error ref. n.r.e.
"0 See Hamlin v. Bryant, 399 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) listing many ac-
ceptable questions. See also GILBERT, TEXAS ESTATES MANUAL § 21.08, at 251 (1963);
ATKINSON, WILLS § 51, at 232 (2d ed. 1953), discussing further questions which would
probably be acceptable in Texas. But cf. Pickering v. Harris, 23 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1930), stating that breaking down the elements of testamentary capacity into any of
the above noted questions is merely asking the issue of testamentary capacity indirectly.
Radkey has apparently overruled Pickering in all aspects; see note 23 infra and accompany-
ing text.
'180 Tex. 514 (1891).
"88 Tex. 350, 31 S.W. 621 (1895).
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Harris"3 held that Brown had definitely overruled Scalf, the court also
setting out a strict policy against admission. Pickering was a com-
mission of appeals case, and later Texas cases continued to take two
lines, some following Pickering' and others following a more liberal
approach."5 Radkey, by overruling Pickering, put the issue to rest,
supporting a liberal policy of admission by stating: "[T]he jury in
cases such as these should be given all relevant and competent testi-
mony with regard to the mental condition of the testatrix; and in
our opinion, competent evidence about her mental condition and
mental ability or lack of it ... should be admitted.""6 The court jus-
tified its less restrictive policy on grounds that jurors have the men-
tality and capacity to avoid bowing "too readily to the opinions of an
expert or otherwise influential witness." 7
The opinion then considered the argument that the province of
the jury can be invaded by witnesses testimony, noting that legal
writers have criticized such a theory for being misleading, unsound,
and absurd. The court pointed out that the witness' function is to
give any testimony which is helpful to the jury and that the jury
should weigh all the evidence for reliability as well as credibility. Dis-
carding the ultimate-issue theory, the court said, "there are many
occasions on which a witness may be asked the same question the jury
must answer."'" It then affirmed the law-fact distinction as the proper
theory to be applied, stating that testimony should be excluded from
jury consideration only when it forces a witness to delve into matters
of law."'
The test applied by the court to distinguish between law and fact
is: if the testimony involves a legal definition or conclusion, it is
properly excluded; and if the testimony relates to testator's mental
condition, it is admissible. By using this test, the court elected the
substantive over the word-of-art approach, although even under
the test, most likely the phrase "legal capacity" is still a word-of-art
causing exclusion. The court, having approved questions using the
phrases "sound mind" and "mental capacty," evidently intends that
these phrases are not equated with legal capacity.
a 2 3 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930).
24 Bryant v. Hamlin, 373 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. 1963); In re Estate of Northcutt, 340
S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) error ref. n.r.e.; Boll v. Boll, 248 S.W.2d 978 (Tex. 1952)
error ref. -n.r.e.
'Adamson v. Burgle, 186 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref. w.m.
"'Carr v. Radkey, 393 S.W.2d 806, 813 (Tex. 1965).27 Id. at 812.
21 Ibid. The court cited Federal Underwriters Exch. v. Cost, 132 Tex. 299, 123 S.W.2d
332 (1938) and also noted that some authorities would permit questions on the ultimate
issue.
29393 S.W.2d at 813.
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